Parker for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; by Thomas I. Daye for the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers; by Earle K. Upon audit of Goldsboro's records for the years 1969 through 1972, the IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an organization described in 501(c)(3), and therefore was required to pay taxes under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Goldstein for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al.; by Leon Silverman, Linda R. Mansfield for the National Association of Independent Schools; by Charles E. Goldsboro never received a determination by the IRS that it was an organization entitled to tax exemption under 501(c)(3). In 1891, in a restatement of the English law of charity 13 which has long been recognized as a leading authority in this country, Lord Mac Naghten stated: "`Charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads." Commissioners v. After paying a portion of the federal unemployment taxes for a certain taxable year, the University filed a refund action in Federal District Court, and the Government counterclaimed for unpaid taxes for that and other taxable years. 81-1, petitioner Goldsboro Christian Schools maintains a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students.
Thereafter, in July 1970, the IRS concluded that it could "no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status [under 501(c)(3)] to private schools which practice racial discrimination." IRS News Release, July 7, 1970, reprinted in App. On June 30, 1971, the three-judge District Court issued its opinion on the merits of the Mississippi challenge. By the letter of November 30, 1970, that followed the injunction issued in Green v. After failing to obtain an assurance of tax exemption through administrative means, the University instituted an action in 1971 seeking to enjoin the IRS from revoking the school's tax-exempt status. The University subsequently filed returns under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act for the period from December 1, 1970, to December 31, 1975, and paid a tax totalling $21 on one employee for the calendar year of 1975. To be eligible for an exemption under that section, an institution must be "charitable" in the common-law sense, and therefore must not be contrary to public policy. The school offers classes from kindergarten through high school, and since at least 1969 has satisfied the State of North Carolina's requirements for secular education in private schools.
By letter dated November 30, 1970, the IRS formally notified private schools, including those involved in this litigation, of this change in policy, "applicable to all private schools in the United States at all levels of education." See id., at A232. That rule reads: The University continues to deny admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. Until 1970, the IRS extended tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University under 501(c)(3). 1127 (DC 1970), the IRS formally notified the University of the change in IRS policy, and announced its intention to challenge the tax-exempt status of private schools practicing racial discrimination in their admissions policies. On January 19, 1976, the IRS officially revoked the University's tax-exempt status, effective as of December 1, 1970, the day after the University was formally notified of the change in IRS policy. 1150 (DC 1971), with approval, the Court of Appeals concluded that 501(c)(3) must be read against the background of charitable trust law.
Montgomery for the National Association of Evangelicals; and by Congressman Trent Lott, pro se. Inman for the International Human Rights Law Group; by Robert H. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 644 F.2d 879 (1981) (per curiam). organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . Petitioners argue that the plain language of the statute guarantees them tax-exempt status. This "charitable" concept appears explicitly in 170 of the Code.
Ellis for the Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the Christian Legal Society; by Forest D. Raim for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; by John H. Lake, and Adam Yarmolinsky for Independent Sector; by Amy Young-Anawaty, David Carliner, Burt Neuborne, and Harry A. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment for the IRS on its counterclaim. or educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemption. Such an examination reveals unmistakable evidence that, underlying all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charity - namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy. "A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man." Ould v.
Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-exempt status to private schools, without regard to their racial admissions policies, under 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. 8 The District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina decided the action on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court also rejected Goldsboro's arguments that denial of tax-exempt status violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Section 501(c)(3) therefore must be analyzed and construed within the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and against the background of the congressional purposes.